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Abstract
The Political Economy of Long Run Growth in Angola -
 Everyone Wants Oil and Diamonds but They Can Make Life Difficult
Oil and diamond money are at the same time the biggest economic opportunity for
Angola as well as being the biggest economic problem.  Angola suffers from an extreme case of
“Dutch Disease”, the common name for the constellation of distortions and problems that often
plague oil-rich low income countries, and it is tempting to view its prospects for future
development solely through this lens.  However, the details of the Angolan case are of particular
importance since the interaction of oil and diamond money with existing political and regional
divisions in the country magnifies the difficulties of resolving either the economic or the political
problems that have prevented progress for the past several decades.  This paper discusses the
ways in which mineral income not only distorts the economy, but reinforces political divides that
have existed for centuries.  It is argued that a durable solution to Angola’s conflicts requires
addressing all of these issues simultaneously since they all contribute to the current problems and
line up precisely the same groups in opposition to each other.  These “axes of polarization”
include coastal vs.  interior, rural vs.  urban/industrial, Mbundu/mestiHo vs.  Ovimbundu and
MPLA vs. UNITA.  This discussion sets the stage for consideration of  proposals for a way to
overcome these problems and achieve sustained long term growth.
1The Political Economy of Long Run Growth in Angola -
 Everyone Wants Oil and Diamonds but They Can Make Life Difficult
I. Introduction
The extent of oil dependence in Angola is extreme.  In fact, it is well beyond that of
almost all other oil exporting countries, and is well beyond that of any other oil exporter in
Africa.  (See Table 1)  This, together with the glaringly obvious economic distortions that come
from the high levels of oil-funded spending, makes it superficially attractive to attribute to oil the
primary causal role not only in Angola’s short run economic problems, but also in its long term
growth and development prospects as well.
While it would be silly to deny that oil (and to a lesser extent, diamonds) play a dominant
role in the country’s macroeconomy, it is also true that this income, when viewed in a longer
historical perspective, can be seen as reinforcing regional and political divisions some of which 
have been evident since the earliest days of Portuguese conquest and colonization.  These long
run features of the Angolan political and economic landscape have interacted with the oil
syndrome in a way which has resulted in a far more pronounced case of oil-induced economic
distortions than would otherwise have resulted, and also in a far more vicious and destructive
civil conflict than might otherwise have occurred.
Students of the Angolan agony of the 1980's, 1990's and thereafter cannot help but
conclude that a substantial share of the blame for the constant relapse into war and destruction
lies in a simple power struggle over oil and diamond money.  Hodges (2001) and Malaquias
(2001) are  persuasive discussions of this, and it is clear that to a great extent, this is true.1 
Additionally, there is also the issue of the personal quest for power on the part of Jonas Savimbi,
an observation that is borne out by the extreme repression that has existed within UNITA and the
personality cult that has been cultivated in the party and the areas it controls.  However, it is
likely that even if the “one bullet solution” that some advocated to end Savimbi’s career had been
implemented successfully, there would have been no lack of candidates to succeed him given
2UNITA’s control during the 1990's of an estimated $380 million/year of diamond income2 and its
position as the primary political party of  the millions of Ovimbundu who comprise nearly one
third of the Angolan population.  Indeed, though UNITA appears to be in danger of
fragmentation following Savimbi’s death, there are numerous aspirants to his role as leader of
UNITA and spokesman for the Ovimbundu people.  
Thus, it is very difficult to separate the current conflict from oil and diamond money and
it is not the intent of this paper to try.  Rather, it is argued here that any solution to the overall
situation in Angola must take into account the fact that the economic distortions caused by the oil
and diamond money (and here we can include the political power struggle that it engenders) have
a mutually reinforcing relationship with other polarizing forces of long standing historical
duration in the country.  That is, even if the problems of disposing of mineral wealth are dealt
with (or the oil runs out eventually) the pre-existing historical animosities and tensions that exist
in the country will remain, and will have to be dealt with at the same time if a truly sustainable
solution is to be found.  To deal with only one of the dimensions of the current polarized
situation is a recipe for failure since the remaining tensions will tend to reignite the conflict if
they are not addressed also.  Angola is not unique in having historical tensions and dichotomies. 
Other countries around the world and in Sub Saharan Africa suffer from many of the same issues
to a greater or lesser degree.  However, what is striking in the Angolan case is that these pre-
existing divisions are all aligned in such a way as to cause the polarizing forces to line up
precisely the same groups in opposition to each other over each of these issues.
The most obvious of these divisions is that between the people dwelling on the coast and
those in the interior.  In the simplest geographical sense, those who control access to foreign
markets exercise, in any country, economic power over those in the interior.  In the Angolan case,
this power resides in coastal cities, particularly Luanda and Benguela, through which foreign
trade occurs.
The second “axis” of polarization exacerbated by oil and diamond income is that between
3agricultural populations and urban/industrial populations.  This is a division that has analogues in
virtually every country that has undergone economic structural transformation from a low income
and predominantly agricultural economy to a high income industrialized one.  In the United
States, for example, this tension was exemplified in the late 19th century by William Jennings
Bryan and the Populist movement, which based itself primarily in agricultural areas of the
Midwest, in opposition to Eastern urban industrial interests.  In Angola, a similar division exists,
and it is aligned so as to place in opposition the same people who find themselves on opposite
sides of the port/interior dichotomy above.
The third division is ethnic - The inland Ovimbundu planalto vs.  the mainly Mbundu and
mixed blood urban industrial elites.  As in many parts of Africa, ethnic or tribal allegiances and
identities are often more important than national ones, and this is as true in Angola as it is
elsewhere.  Both groups are linguistically and culturally distinct from each other, and often view
themselves as historically opposed, as indeed has been the case for centuries.  As in the above
two axes of tension, this one lines up in precisely the same geographical and economic manner,
thus providing yet another mutually reinforcing support to the overall nexus.
It should come as no surprise that internal political alignments reflect the three
dichotomies above.  Indeed UNITA has long has its base in the agricultural heartland of the
country, the mainly Ovimbundu areas of the central highlands while the MPLA has as its primary
base of support the urban/industrial areas of the coast.  However, this divide has been
exacerbated by the superimposition of geopolitics - UNITA has been for many years supported
by the United States and South Africa, while the MPLA with its avowedly Marxist origins, was
supported by the USSR and its proxy, Cuba.  It is clear that oil has played a major role in the
importance assigned to this particular internal conflict in the eyes of the superpowers - other Sub-
Saharan African countries without oil have not merited anything like the level of attention and
support accorded Angola even though many have had similar political dynamics at work.
The real exchange rate distortions inherent in Dutch Disease together with the enclave
4nature of offshore oil production serve to make each of these divisions more contentious than
they would naturally be (not to deemphasize how bad that can get - civil wars are routinely
fought over such issues).  In a nutshell, these distortions tend to penalize sectors that produce
“traded” commodities (i.e. the agricultural areas of the interior) and to reward those who can
control the revenue streams generated, (i.e. the urban areas and the central government
apparatus).
The next section of the paper discusses the economic distortions that occur in oil
exporting countries and how this syndrome has manifested itself in Angola.  This is followed by
a discussion of each of the four axes of polarization above : port vs.  interior, rural/agricultural
vs.  urban/industrial, Mbundu vs.  Ovimbundu and MPLA vs.  UNITA.  The next section
discusses the intersection of these with oil-induced distortions and the prospects for a sustainable
growth strategy.
5II.  Oil Money, Macro Distortions, and the Angolan Economy
This section first provides a brief overview of the Angolan economy in order to lay the
foundation for a discussion of the role of oil and diamond money in producing the extreme
economic dislocations of the past twenty years.  The second part of this section builds on this
discussion to discuss the major policy options open to the government for dealing with these
problems.
An Economic Overview - Where is the Angolan Economy Now?
Prior to independence in 1975, Angola was better known as a coffee exporter than as an
oil exporter.  Agriculture in general was the base of the Angolan economy, and food crops as
well as cash crops played an important role in the country’s domestic economy as well as in its
balance of payments.  Angola was not only the world’s fourth largest coffee exporter, but also
exported over 400,000 MT of maize annually, making it one of the largest staple food exporters
in Sub Saharan Africa.  Oil, while having been discovered prior to independence, had not yet
achieved the high production levels that would be seen in the 1980's and thereafter.
The massive inflow of oil receipts since that time (amounting to more than half of GDP)
has caused distortions typical of oil exporting economies, and commonly known as "Dutch
Disease".   This refers to the problems of exchange rate overvaluation and relative price
distortions that result in strong urban bias and stagnation of non-oil exports and import
competing sectors.  Diamonds constitute an additional factor exacerbating the already strong
effects from oil. The activities most adversely affected are those most exposed to competition
from abroad, in this case, agriculture and light manufacturing and agro-processing sectors which
have been virtually 100% replaced by imports in the large urban markets on the coast.  Angola’s
exports of both of its major pre-oil export  crops, maize and coffee,  are now near zero.
The enclave nature of oil production is especially pronounced in Angola, where oil
6literally never touches the territory of the country apart from the Province of Cabinda which is
separated from the bulk of the country by Congo.  Offshore production is increasing with
additional exploration continuing in order to expand output substantially over the next few years. 
(Production is expected to expand from a current level of approximately 750,000 barrels/day to 1
million barrels/day)  Virtually all inputs used in production are imported by the concessionaires,
including the majority of oil company workers.
The production enclave is matched by a consumption enclave in that oil receipts are used
primarily to service foreign debt and to support the government budget which is expended mainly
on defense, debt service and maintenance of the central government apparatus in Luanda.  The
resulting boom in spending has resulted in a highly inflationary economy in Luanda in which
many of the  traditional links to productive areas in the interior have been broken.  In effect,
Angola has two economies, one reliant on imports financed by oil receipts, while the bulk of the
population lives in abject poverty divorced from the formal economy.  In spite of the fact that
most of the windfall has been spent on imports, and so has not directly affected the real exchange
rate, enough of the additional demand has fallen on non-traded sectors to create a chronic
problem of overvaluation, which has proven particularly hard to deal with given the difficulties
in reestablishing domestic productive capacity.
Government expenditures have exceeded oil receipts, due both to large military
expenditures necessitated by the war and more recently by the military expeditions sent to
support factions in the conflicts in the two Congos, and the need to make payments on the
external debt, which stood at approximately $10.3 billion by  the end of 20003.  At present, a
substantial part of oil production is  devoted to debt service, though there are more new fields
scheduled to enter into production in the near future.  This will avoid a crisis in the near term by
allowing financing gaps to be covered, but will merely postpone the inevitable adjustment to a
later date at which time the gaps will be larger, the imbalances more severe, and the debt larger.
The government has periodically announced reform programs designed to end the periods
7of hyperinflation that have plagued the country since the end of the command economy at the
beginning of the 1990's.  Unfortunately, none of these has proved successful for a sustained
period of time, with control measures which are capable of repressing inflation for a time but
which do not address underlying problems of fiscal imbalance and money creation to finance the
resulting deficits.  This pattern has continued to the present, with the latest IMF Article IV
consultation of February 2002 calling a decline in inflation to 116%/year in 2001 “an important
achievement”.  However, even this has only been possible at the cost of substantial arrears in
government payments to workers and has still left the government deficit at 7% of GDP.4  Table
2 shows the evolution of Angolan economic growth and inflation over recent years, illustrating
some of the extreme dislocations that have recurred during that time.
Table 3 shows trade figures for Angola in recent years, in all of which oil has accounted
for 90% or more of exports.  In terms of imports, food and other consumer goods have grown to
a dominant position, squeezing out imports of intermediate and capital goods which previously
were the dominant import items.  Overall, the merchandise trade balance shows a large surplus
due to the large exports of oil.  In spite of this large positive merchandise trade balance the
balance on current account has been negative in every year since 1987.  This is largely due to the
large payments to oil companies and for interest on the foreign debt. 
Oil Economies and Growth - How to Avoid Major Distortions from a Major Inflow of Money
The section above documents both the extreme nature of oil dependence in Angola and
the severe nature of the economic dislocations that have resulted from it.  At the most general
level, there are two main issues involved with this income:
1. How fast to exploit the various mineral resources.
2. How to spend the money.
8How Fast to Exploit the Oil
With regard to the first issue, there is an extensive literature on the dangers of excessively
rapid exploitation of oil reserves and expenditure of the funds in ways that do not contribute to
long run growth and welfare.  In particular, Gelb et. al. have shown in numerous case studies,
including several directly relevant to the Angolan case, that the distortions which result from
large expenditures in the near term can in the end leave a country worse off than it was in the
beginning.  Given Angola's markedly greater dependence on these revenues than any of the
countries whose experience forms the basis for these observations, there is good reason for
caution.
Essentially, the issue is this: Large inflows of foreign exchange have the potential to
generate highly undesirable effects on the domestic structure of production and consumption due
to the short run incentives to capture the large rents available.  However, distortions in the
domestic economy can be avoided if the foreign exchange bonanza is spent on imports rather
than domestically produced goods and services.  In the Angolan case, this is what has for the
most part been occurring to date on both the input side of oil production and on the expenditure
side once receipts have been received.  Even so, a substantial amount of the demand created by
the oil windfall has fallen on non-traded goods, particularly in urban areas, where services and
housing account for a large share of expenditures by the rich.
On the production side, the offshore nature of Angolan production today, and the original
location of much of the production in the physically separate province of Cabinda, have
reinforced the oil companies' historical inclination to extract the oil with 100% imported
technology operated virtually 100% by expatriate workers, who live in contained facilities with
virtually no linkages with the domestic economy.  Accordingly, there are no significant effects in
terms of 'resource pull' from the rest of the Angolan economy since the oil sector makes almost
no use of any domestic capital, labor, or even consumption items for its work force.  It is likely
9that this situation will persist in the future given the fact that Angola continues to contract
extraction out to various foreign oil companies which operate their concessions as enclaves.  In
the case of diamonds, the sector is not physically isolated as is the case for oil (diamonds are
located primarily in the northeastern provinces) but the production process provides little
opportunity for significant backward linkages to the rest of the economy.
On the expenditure side, all of the oil money has accrued to the central government
apparatus, which has spent by far the largest part of its income on imports.  During the height of
the civil conflict this was largely unavoidable, as large purchases of weapons were needed.  In
terms of consumption items, the physical barriers to trade between the large coastal urban centers
and the rest of the country made it extremely difficult for any of the expenditures to translate into
demand for domestic products.  Everything from clothes to food to consumer durables has been
imported.
While there is some apparent tendency toward the "normal" Dutch Disease pattern of high
levels of expenditures on labor services, this is not primarily a product of bloated government
wage bills as is the case in some other countries.  Though the government labor force is clearly
larger than warranted, the vast majority of these functionaries are so underpaid that salaries in
fact constitute a relatively small share of the government budget compared to other countries at a
comparable level of income.  Insofar as there are greater expenditures on services in urban
centers such as Luanda, this has occurred via the personal consumption decisions of those
segments of society benefitting from the bulk of the oil revenue.  In addition, it is also important
to bear in mind the large military establishments maintained by both sides in the civil conflicts of
the past years.
What this means in terms of the internal and external balance of the Angolan economy is
that the balance of payments has remained severely in deficit while pressures on the real
exchange rate have been far less than would be the case if some of the oil funded demand had
fallen on domestic production.  Even so, it is clear even to a casual empirical observer of the
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urban economy in Luanda and other cities, that prices are quite high by international standards. 
Even at black market exchange rates, Luanda is a very expensive city, comparable to large cities
in Europe and North America, which is a testament to the high levels of demand resulting from
mineral income.
So, if one of the basic problems is the inability of the economy to absorb the large sums
of money spent in the short run without detrimental distortions, then one possible solution would
be to save some of the money offshore, or to simply pump the oil out at a slower rate.  The first
option is one that has not been achieved with any great degree of success by any oil exporting
country to date.  There are simply too many pressures on the government officials both
personally and in their official capacities to spend the money when it becomes available.  Even
so, the government can achieve much the same effect by using revenues to pay off past foreign
debt to the extent possible.  So far, this has not occurred, both because of political issues
surrounding debt repayment and because the government has in fact been dedicating future oil
production to servicing current debt obligations to such an extent that most of the revenue has
gone to this end.
This is an important reason why the present situation offers some opportunities which
have not been possible in the past.  Given the large new oil fields coming on line now and in the
near future, there is a window of opportunity for the government to use the additional windfall to
make the adjustments needed to get out of the vicious circle of mortgaging increasing amounts of
current production to future debt service.  The alternative is to spend the money now and
continue the pattern of the past, but at a higher level of debt.
How to Spend the Mineral Revenues
The basic problem of oil economies, that of a highly overvalued exchange rate, has the
effect of imposing high implicit costs on those sectors most exposed to international trade, either
because they produce export products, or because they face actual or potential import
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competition.  Accordingly, the factors of production employed in these sectors suffer, and to the
extent they are able, migrate toward uses in which they can earn greater rewards, in this case  the
urban centers where oil money is received and spent.
In the Angolan case, it is clear that the hardest hit sector is agriculture, together with
associated processing and transforming industries.  Angola has historically demonstrated a strong
comparative advantage in agriculture (see above) and this sector provides employment and
income for the majority of the population.  Therefore, from a the point of view of both poverty
and equity, there is a powerful case to be made to avoid overvaluation to the extent possible to
avoid penalizing this sector.
Even if exchange rate overvaluation persists to some degree, the strong underlying
comparative advantage in agriculture suggests a government investment strategy directed toward
provision of infrastructure and public goods which can help lower costs of production in this
sector.  Obvious candidates are rehabilitation of the country's transportation system, including
roads, ports and railroads, as well as investments in agricultural research and extension.  All of
this is, of course, predicated on a successful continuation of the peace process and resettlement of
rural populations in producing areas.  In addition, lack of public services such as water and
sanitation, as well as electricity and other utilities are a serious constraint to industrial investment
and rehabilitation.  Investment in human capital, especially primary education, is another area
where high long term returns can be gained.
In summary, the experience of other oil countries, and the theoretical literature on Dutch
Disease effects, show that the distortions induced, particularly via the exchange rate, create very
adverse conditions for other sectors.  As noted above, in the Angolan case agriculture is the most
important of these, both in terms of its share of the labor force and due to the well demonstrated
comparative advantage enjoyed by the country.  There are also a range of light manufacturing
activities which would be rapidly developed by the private sector given appropriate conditions. 
Accordingly, some clear long term policy prescriptions emerge from this analysis:
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1. Maintenance of an appropriately valued exchange rate is paramount.  As argued above, this
will depend to a great extent on the ability to control inflation which in turn depends on fiscal
control.
2. Free access to foreign exchange and ease of international trade (i.e. elimination of bureaucratic
barriers.
3. A program of investment in public goods necessary to the agricultural sector and rehabilitation
of manufacturing.
4. A program of investment in human capital via rebuilding of schools and basic social services.
All of these conditions are important to maintain incentives for foreign investment, which
will itself help speed the process of rehabilitation of the economy and achieving a sustained
growth in non-oil output.  However, the most important factor, indeed a prerequisite, for
reactivating foreign investment even given the most liberal law possible, is the level of
confidence in the government and the credibility of its policies in terms of maintaining a stable
and favorable environment for business.
The stop-go reform and retreats of the past years have not helped create a feeling of
confidence - some degree of constancy is imperative if the government is to hope to attract any
substantial investment outside of the oil and diamond sectors. 
Finally, it needs to be recognized that all of the discussion about Angola's future depends
on the assumption that peace can be maintained and that the process of political reconciliation
continues.  Without this, and without a continuation of the mine clearance and resettlement
which began after the signing of the Lusaka Accords, there is little basis for any progress.  
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III.  Historical Axes of Polarization in Angola from Colonial Times to the Present
Section II above documents the way in which oil dependence has affected Angola and the
nature of the economic imperatives that this generates.  This section discusses four major pre-
existing axes of polarization in Angola: Port vs.  Interior;  Rural/Agricultural vs.
Urban/Industrial; Mbundu vs. Ovimbundu; MPLA vs.  UNITA.  This last section also discusses
the role of external geopolitical influences in reinforcing internal political divisions.
A. Port vs.  Interior 
In any part of the world, those who control coastal areas and/or ports exercise a degree of
control over interior landlocked areas by virtue of their ability to control or charge for access to
outside markets.  Indeed, major conflicts in world history have revolved around just such access
to the sea - one need only look at the centuries-long Russian goal to control the Dardanelles,
which constitutes a choke-point for its warm water southern ports, or the long running European
debates over the “Polish Corridor” and the status of the port of Gdansk (Danzig).  In the
developing world, just such considerations motivate the long term tension between landlocked
Bolivia and Chile, which wrested Bolivia’s coastal provinces away in the latter half of the 19th
century.  
There is a real economic foundation for these conflicts: whoever controls access to
outside markets can charge a price for the privilege.  That means a markup on every import item
transshipped to the interior and a tax on every export item that exits the country through the port. 
The importance of free access to a port has been shown empirically by Bloom and Sachs (1998)
who analyzed the growth records Sub- Saharan African countries and found that geographical
access to a port was a significant determinant of growth prospects.5  The same logic applies to
landlocked areas within a country, particularly when the country in question is composed of
provinces which have some degree of de facto autonomy, or the central government apparatus
uses control of ports to generate revenue for its own use.
14
This is no different in Angola than it is elsewhere, with the major ports of Luanda and
Lobito/Benguela playing the most important role, but also to some extent the lesser ports of
Namibe, Porto Amboim, Ambriz and others.  In colonial times as well as more recently, the
central government (be it Portuguese or Angolan) has explicitly and implicitly taxed both
agricultural exports (particularly coffee through the government marketing board) and imports of
all descriptions, through tariffs and import quotas.  
These direct controls and taxes have been supplemented with indirect methods such as
foreign exchange controls which have over various periods been used to deny foreign exchange
to disfavored individuals or activities, surrender requirements which have forced exporters to
exchange foreign currency for domestic currency, and exchange rate overvaluation, which
penalizes exporters and importers who cannot get access to foreign exchange in favor of those
who the government chooses to give access to its limited supplies.  In Angola this category has
most often been comprised of government officials and coastally based trading, processing and
manufacturing activities which have operated to the benefit of coastally based people.
Historically, the importance of controlling access to foreign markets first arose after the
arrival of the Portuguese in the late 15th century.  This is due to the fact that prior to this time the
most important trading routes in Angola and the Congo Basin in general were overland trade
routes to the East rather than seaborne trade, as was the case in other parts of Africa.6  The arrival
of the Portuguese signaled the opening of these areas to international trade - Indeed, this was the
entire raison d’etre of the Portuguese colonial project in the first place - efforts to colonize in the
1400's and later were better characterized at efforts to either cart off riches such as gold, ivory
and slaves or, if military superiority could not be brought to bear, to trade for these items so that
they could be brought back to Lisbon and used to support the expenditures of the crown and of
the nobility.  Early efforts met with success.  The Portuguese succeeded in trading for gold in
West Africa, (given their inability to conquer the well-organized kingdoms of Mali and Ghana)
and were also successful in promoting a large trade in slaves from other parts of Africa,
particularly the Congo Basin and Angola,  to the islands of Sno TomJ e PrRncipe as well as the
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Gold Coast and also to Portugal itself.
The earliest records of the Portuguese occupation of Angola bear out the discussion
above: conflict between the coast and the interior has been recorded as early as 1506 when the
outward-oriented future King Afonso of the Kongo defeated the reigning monarch and initiated a
period of active participation in the slave trade which dominated European/Kongo relations
throughout the early colonial period.7  In return, the King received exotic trade goods and other
foreign items which enhanced his prestige and control over his dominions.8  The rapid growth of
the slave trade had terrible consequences for the interior of the country.  By the 1560's the
hinterland of the coastal slave ports had become so depopulated and weakened that it was
relatively easy for invading hordes of primitive and reportedly cannibalistic tribal peoples called
Jagas from the east to topple the King and, at least temporarily, put a halt to the previous royal
trading structure.
The Portuguese response was to give up the old colonial model of trading through the
King and to try to impose their own military control directly with a Portuguese army in control of
a restored puppet Kongo monarchy.  This was coupled with attempts to control areas to the South
of the Kongo Kingdom, that controlled by the “Ngola”, which provided a source of slaves which
bypassed the export taxes imposed by the Kongo monarchy.  This proved more difficult than  had
been foreseen, and the invading army took months to advance to the mainland from their first
landing place on a sandy island just off the coast at Luanda.  Even then it was more than 50 years
before any progress at all was made in penetrating the interior of the country - this was eventually
accomplished not as conquerors, but as traders working with coastal allies.9  This pattern of
coastal control by the Portuguese, and domination of external trade with interior regions which
they could not control directly was to continue for the next three centuries - It was not until the
end of the 1890's and the emphasis on direct control in the Scramble for Africa among the
various competing European colonial powers that Portugal could be said to have truly “occupied”
the Angolan hinterland.10
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This history bears out the longstanding nature of coast/interior tensions that date back at
least to the 1600's, if not earlier.  The monopolization of trade with the exterior by the Portuguese
on the coast was a fundamental basis of their ability to expropriate economic surpluses,
something that has continued in post-colonial times by the Portuguese speaking coastal elites
who have replaced the colonialist Portuguese themselves. 
B. Rural/Agricultural vs.  Urban/Industrial 
In Angola, the coast is not only a gatekeeper, as described in the section above, but it is
also the location of the major urban/industrial centers, particularly Luanda, while the interior is
also the location of the most productive agricultural areas, particularly the central planalto where
the principal grain supplies of the country are (or could potentially be) grown.  Even in countries
where this alignment of coast with cities/industries and interior with agriculture doesn’t exist
there remains the tension of agricultural interests versus urban/industrial ones by virtue of the
fact that what one party buys, the other one sells and vice versa.
To be specific, urban/industrial interests depend fundamentally on two agricultural
outputs: 
1.  Food is the primary determinant of urban/industrial real wages since it constitutes the bulk of
expenditures for poor working class people.  Indeed, food prices have often been cited as the
most important single determinant of welfare and income distribution in a country.11
2.  Industries, and particularly the early developing light industries of textiles and food
processing, need agricultural raw materials as inputs.
Rural/agricultural interests depend fundamentally on urban/industrial outputs in two
ways:
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1.  Rural populations buy consumption items that they cannot produce themselves from the
manufacturing sector.  In all but the most primitive subsistence economies, this will include
items such as clothing, fuel, utensils, transportation, etc.
2.  Farms that have advanced beyond the earliest self sufficient shifting cultivation will typically
by inputs and implements from the manufacturing sector, beginning with such items as hoes,
scythes and plows, but progressing to more complex machinery such as tractors, pumps, etc.  In
addition, to the extent that fertilizers or other purchases inputs such as pesticides are used, these
too will come from manufacturing sectors.
The position of the central planalto (including the provinces of Huambo, Bie, parts of
Benguela, Cuanza Sul and Huila) as the “breadbasket” of Angola is well documented
historically, and has been also demonstrated in various analyses of comparative advantage in the
country.12  It is from this area that pre-independence grain export surpluses where taken, and
where most of agricultural GDP originates.  While there are certainly some agricultural activities
that can be pursued in coastal areas, the generally arid conditions in these areas are a barrier to
major agricultural development.
The observation that the principal geographical location of agricultural comparative
advantage lies in the interior has a very important corollary: In order to maximize the return to
this comparative advantage it will be necessary to invest in this area.  While it is not the purpose
of this paper to enumerate the investments necessary for Angolan agricultural investment, it is
safe to say that the needs (as in any country at a similar level of per capita income) are large and
include both on-farm investments that are properly the province of the private sector and large
public sector investments such as roads, extension systems and research.
These investment needs have the potential to be contentious since at first blush the money
would be going to one area of the country seemingly at the expense of other zones.  However, the
experience of many other countries has demonstrated that to attempt to pursue industrialization
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without investing in increased agricultural productivity is a self limiting strategy.  As the
urban/industrial needs for agricultural outputs grow, the agricultural sector must be able to keep
pace since the alternatives are either higher agricultural prices and stagnation or else ever
increasing imports to supply what domestic producers cannot.  Thus, investment in agriculture is
a prerequisite for success for all regions, and not just the agricultural sector alone.
Tension between agricultural interests and urban/industrial interests are part and parcel of
the politics of countries transitioning from low per capita income to high per capita income. 
Every country which has undergone the structural transformation involved has confronted these
issues, including those countries which are currently classified as “developed”.13  Examples
include the period in Britain when the “Corn Laws” where debated by David Ricardo and others,
or the United States during the populist era when William Jennings Bryan, representing
agricultural interests, campaigned on his famous slogan “Don’t crucify us on a cross of gold”.  
Both of these examples reflect the tension over rural/urban terms of trade and issues of
national policy which pit one set of interests against the other.  They are inevitable when a
country moves from a low income, predominantly agricultural economy with 75% or more of the
labor force located on farms, to a higher income, predominantly urban economy with 25% or less
of the population on farms.  In Angola, these natural tensions are exacerbated because the
agricultural interests are at the same time located in the interior, while the urban/industrial
interests are primarily located on the coast, and particularly in Luanda.  In addition, these
agricultural interests are also aligned with one of the main ethnic divides in Angola, which is the
topic of the next section.
C. Mbundu/MestiHo vs. Ovimbundu
The ethnic composition of Angola is, as is often the case in Africa, quite heterogeneous,
including several major and distinct ethno-linguistic groups.  Figure 1 shows the major divisions
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in the country, where it can be seen that the largest single group is the Ovimbundu, who are a
primarily agricultural ethnicity occupying much of the central planalto.  As was the case with
most of the interior peoples of Angola, the Ovimbundu did not live under direct Portuguese
control for most of the colonial period, only coming under explicit Portuguese domination in the
waning years of the 19th century.14
The Mbundu, in contrast, were the only main ethnic group in Angola that came under
direct Portuguese control from a very early date15.  This has resulted in this ethnicity being far
more urbanized and also far more likely to speak Portuguese than are other groups in the country. 
In fact it has recently been estimated that as only 15% of the Angolan population speak
Kimbundu as their mother tongue, in spite of the fact that Mbundu account for nearly a quarter of
the total population.  Indeed, a growing number of Mbundu are now monolingual in Portuguese,
and have no native speaking ability in their own or other African languages.   Over the past 20
years this tendency has become quite pronounced in Luanda among all peoples and not just
among Mbundu as the city has become increasingly populated with people who are monolingual
in Portuguese.16
This is also true of the large mixed-blood mestiHo population that is located in Luanda
and is, along with many Mbundu, a dominant force in the MPLA (see below).  This has been one
of the (sometimes only implied) bases for the frequent UNITA calls for “Africanization” of the
government.  UNITA is almost exclusively an Ovimbundu organization, and though it has not
explicitly identified itself as such, it has always been nearly 100% Ovimbundu in terms of its
leadership, and has made use of its close identification with Ovimbundu people by making its
long time “capital” in Bailundo, the seat of the largest of the Ovimbundu kingdoms that lasted
through the 19th century.
Evidence of the close association of UNITA with Ovimbundu populations can be seen in
the voting of 1992, where UNITA won the presidential race by more than 80% in its three
“home” provinces of Bie, Huambo and Benguela, (which include the “breadbasket” interior
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agricultural areas of the planalto) but failed to outpoll the MPLA in any other province except
sparsely populated Cuando Cubango.  In contrast, the MPLA had a similarly lopsided margin of
victory in its own “home” turf of Luanda, Bengo, Kuanza Norte and Malange, but also polled
strongly in other areas as well.
It has been reported that in the violence following the 1992 election, there were overt
ethnic elements in the fighting in Luanda itself, with Ovimbundu people singled out as UNITA
supporters by the dominant Mbundu and mixed blood population of the city.  While such ethnic
violence is rather the exception in Angola (in marked contrast to such obvious examples as
Rwanda or Zimbabwe) this example does show that there is potential for such problems in the
future, particularly if people are confronted with stressful or difficult situations.17
It is evident that the Ovimbundu/Mbundu divide lines up quite closely with both the
port/interior and the agricultural/urban-industrial divides.  The one possible exception to this is
the fact that the province of Benguela, which is predominantly Ovimbundu, includes the major
port of Lobito-Benguela.  However, throughout much of the conflict of the past decades the
MPLA has controlled the ports and the coastal areas, though it has never been able to extend its
control very far inland.  Thus, the mutually reinforcing nature of these various polarizations
remains clear.
D. MPLA vs. UNITA and the Geopolitical Influence from Outside
Perhaps the best documented “axis of polarization” is that between the MPLA,
historically a Marxist client party of the USSR and its allies, and UNITA, long a client of the US,
South Africa and their allies.  On closer inspection, however, this axis may well be artificial to
some extent, though it is (or at least has been) no less real for having been fueled by external
considerations.
The MPLA is today no longer an avowedly Marxist party, though its command and
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control tendencies continue in virtually unaltered form to dominate the economic policies of the
ruling clique.  That these tendencies may have more to do with self interested desires to control
mineral income than with any real ideological basis is shown by the relatively seamless transition
from “Marxism” to “free market capitalism” in the 1990's, a transition that was marked less by
fundamental economic change than by fundamental change in political alignments with the US
and other large Western powers.  While there are no doubt legitimate roots to the MPLA’s
original Marxist character, it is also true that in fomenting rebellion against a NATO member,
Portugal, the MPLA placed itself firmly on the “wrong” side of the great geopolitical divide of
the time.    That this was more a marriage of convenience than conviction is shown by the fact
that the MPLA did not hesitate to use capitalist oil companies to extract its oil, nor did it
seriously alter its basic outlook when it switched sides thereafter.
UNITA has an even more opportunistic history, as its leader shifted from a one-time
alliance with Communist China to a more lasting alignment with the US and South Africa as it
became entrenched as the principal opposition to the MPLA in the 1970's.  While paying lip
service to free market doctrine it engaged in even stricter control of subject populations than did
the MPLA, and can hardly be seen as an exemplar of democratic or liberal economic principles.
Nevertheless, the fact that these ideological splits, however convenient, did exist provided
a basis for geopolitical interference that was at its roots fueled by the desire to control oil and
diamond sources and to deny them to the other side.  This consideration has led to a level of
superpower interest in the Angolan conflict that has been absent from other African civil wars. 
Indeed, it has been argued by Munslow (1999) that this interest has been responsible for the
inability of the international community to reach a consensus regarding a way out of the Angolan
impasse.18
Entirely apart from ideological or geopolitical concerns, the political issues inherent in
the MPLA/UNITA split are fundamental to any long term resolution to the Angolan conflict.
  First, is the problem of maintaining a viable democracy, as urged by outside powers, in a
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situation where the two main parties have such a strong regional base.  Any victory at the
national level by one side or the other will be seen by the loser as a “conquest” as much as an
electoral loss.  Indeed, given the mutually opposing economic interests outlined above, it is
difficult to see how simple majority rule at the national level can ever be seen as legitimate by a
large segment of the population.
Such a situation would seem to support the notion that some sort of federal system, where
a great deal of power is devolved to the provincial level, would be one possible recipe for a
peaceful resolution.  However, there are two main problems with this: First is the historical
tradition of a unified state under strong central control that is an historical legacy from colonial
times and which has been adhered to by both political parties ever since.  There is no tradition of
power sharing or of division of power in Angola and no political culture of such
accommodations upon which to build.  Second is the fact that the main prize in the political
competition - the billions of dollars of annual mineral income - is not easily divided territorially. 
In fact, neither the oil, which is located mostly offshore, nor the diamonds, which are located
primarily in the northeast provinces of the Lundas, are physically located in the “home turf” of
either political party.
What this means is that either a formula for dividing power and income will have to be
reached prior to achieving peace, or there will have to be a total military victory by one side or
the other.  Given that each side represents a large percentage of the total population, it is hard to
see how the latter can ever be finally achieved, though the MPLA is certainly trying at the present
time.  Unfortunately, it is likely that no matter how determinedly the MPLA and the FAA pursue
and wipe out remnants of UNITA’s guerilla army, the underlying differences that generate the
conflict will retain the potential to inspire a resurgence of this activity in the future.
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IV.  How to Promote Peace and Sustainable Development in Angola
This section first discusses the standard economic prescriptions deriving from Angola’s
oil-export induced distortions and how these line up with the axes of polarization discussed in
the previous section.  Second is a discussion of the political realities of reaching a viable
solution, both in terms of the regional accommodations that would be required, and the need for
ruling elites to be willing to acquiesce in a fundamental change in the current situation.
Dutch Disease and the Axes of Polarization
Over the long run, there are two important areas of potential problems in achieving a
national consensus on a macro strategy for growth and development.  The first is the issue of
mineral rents from oil, diamonds and other sources, and the decision as to how and when to
spend the income.  The second is the difference in economic interests between agricultural
regions and urban populations.  However, on closer inspection it apparent that these are really
just different facets of the same issue.
The Dutch Disease diagnosis has clear implications for investment and growth over the
long term - Given a disease which causes trade exposed sectors in which the country has a
potential comparative advantage to stagnate and wither, the prescription for addressing this
problem is to invest in these areas so as to prevent their atrophy.  The underlying rationale is
clear: If Angola is not to place all of its eggs in one (oil) basket, then it is essential that it retain 
its ability to produce in those other sectors which historically have provided it with the bulk of its
exports since these same sectors will constitute the main economic fall back if and when oil
revenues decline in the future.  In Angola it is obvious that these sectors are found in agriculture
and related processing activities.
Additional benefits from such an agriculturally driven investment strategy would be
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found in the areas of income distribution and poverty alleviation.  Development of rural areas
would at the same time promote income growth for the poorest segments of Angolan society,
discourage urban migration, and help to reduce and eventually eliminate the huge food import
bills currently incurred by the large coastal population centers.  Unfortunately, it is precisely
these characteristics which present some of the biggest potential obstacles to implementation of
this plan.
The problem is this: If an agricultural investment strategy is to be successful, then it must
focus on the areas of highest agricultural potential, i.e. the agricultural breadbasket of the central
planalto, which is at one and the same time an interior agricultural region whose core is the
homeland of the Ovimbundu people and the center of UNITA support.  In short, this strategy
would require the MPLA to focus investment directly on their erstwhile opponents rather than on
their own supporters, who live in areas which are largely much less favorable in agroclimatic
terms than is the central planalto.  Indeed, the coastal regions where MPLA control has been
strongest are precisely the areas with the least agricultural potential, having insufficient rainfall to
support large scale rainfed agriculture.
An enlightened view of the growth and development prospects for the country might help
promote such a strategy.  In fact, a concerted program of assistance to the UNITA areas may well
be the single most important facet of a true plan for national reconciliation, in addition to having
positive benefits for urban areas as well since a resurgent agricultural sector would go far toward
lowering food prices throughout the country.  The prospects for such a scenario are evaluated in
the next section.
Rents, Elites and the Incentive to Reform
It is perhaps a truism that in order for reform to be pursued, it must be perceived to be in
the best interests of those who must make the decision to do it.  In the case of Angola there are
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particularly high obstacles to achieving this perception, stemming from the current structure of
oil-derived foreign exchange inflows and the distortions they induce. 
First and foremost is the fact that the oil rents are controlled by the central government
and allocated as dictated by those in charge of it.  What this has meant in the past is that the
political elite of the MPLA has been insulated from the economic problems afflicting the rest of
the population due to their ability to control foreign exchange receipts and purchase needed
consumption items from abroad.  While most of the population has been suffering from the
collapse of domestic production and rampant hyperinflation over the past decades, those in a
position of privilege have had preferential access to foreign markets in order to avoid these
problems, creating an artificial economy in Luanda which is almost entirely divorced from the
rest of the country.
Not only has foreign exchange been allocated on a formulaic, preferential basis, but there
has also been a huge problem of preferential exchange rates as well.  Government purchases have
been made in many instances at an official exchange rate which has been extremely overvalued,
providing those with access the opportunity for quick profits on an enormous scale by purchasing
goods at official exchange rates and reselling them at parallel market prices.  Even now, with the
parallel market premium lower than it was, control is instead exerted through import licensing.
What this means is that those currently benefitting from the present situation will not be
better off in the short run after implementation of a reform program which eliminates these
preferences and distortions.  It is simply not accurate, and certainly not persuasive, to attempt to
make the case for reform on the basis of a supposed improvement in the situation for the political
elite because it will not happen.  Rather, a case for reform must rest on the fact that the problems
afflicting the Angolan economy are well known, and the trajectory of the economy, and that of
the elites who benefit from the current situation will inevitably result in a less favorable situation
in the long run if reforms are avoided in the short run.  In addition, there are real questions as to
whether political and social stability can be maintained if the situation for the general public
26
continues to deteriorate.  At some point it becomes difficult to hire and pay enough police to
contain unrest if urban poor are continually subjected to a worsening economic situation while
those in powerful positions are so obviously wealthy.  If reform is avoided, there will be another
period of prosperity for those with preferential access to oil receipts as the new production areas
come on line.  However, this strategy merely perpetuates the pattern of mortgaging oil production
to pay off debt, a pattern which can only continue as long as oil production growth continues to
outpace the growth of foreign debt and the cost of servicing it. 
This point is extremely important;  foreign debt, if it is never paid down (as has been the
case to date) never stops growing.  Oil production growth does.  While the outlook at the present
time  may appear favorable due to the imminent opening of new production, there is no reason to
believe that current growth rates in output can be maintained forever.  If, in fact, oil production
growth cannot be maintained forever, then the day will inevitably come when oil output must
once again be dedicated in its entirety to service foreign debt, as would have been the case in a
very few years if the new oil fields had not been discovered.
It is useful to emphasize that every single country which has enjoyed an oil windfall has
suffered from these problems to some degree.  Angola is in fact a more extreme case due to the
higher degree of oil dependence as compared to other countries.  Even Saudi Arabia, where oil
discoveries were so huge relative to the economy and the population that it seemed that they were
inexhaustible, is now facing the fact that oil production growth cannot remain higher than
expenditure growth forever, and that even in this case, adjustments are needed at some point. 
The key is that it is clear that adjustments taken early are far less painful and have far greater
potential to result in a greater level of welfare in general than would be the case if they are
delayed.
One fortunate aspect of the political economy of reform is that there are very few adverse
implications for poverty or other social dimensions.  The benefits from the current situation are
concentrated in a relatively few hands, so removal of them will not affect the vast majority of the
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population in the short term.  In effect, they have little to lose and a reform of investment policy
and/or mineral income flows will not make their situation any worse than it already is.  In the
long run, an adjustment/investment program has substantial potential to improve the situation of
these segments of society, as they can take advantage of growth in such trade exposed sectors as
agriculture.
A Way Out?
It is dangerous for any observer of the Angolan situation to pretend to have found a
solution that can bring sustained peace with any certainty.  However, the discussion presented
here does suggest several possible elements of a long term solution.
1.  First and foremost would be to recognize the fact of the regional split that is so obvious by
allowing political power to mirror these realities.  This would imply providing for strong
provincial governments with substantial power over affairs within their borders.   A federal
system, with powers of defense and authority over inter-provincial and foreign trade (among
others) reserved to the central government would help promote a feeling of ownership in the
system on the part of the various factions involved while at the same time allowing each to
express itself politically.  This last point is particularly important, and is a strong reason to allow
provincial governors to be elected locally rather than being appointed from Luanda since this
would allow each faction to be ruled directly by members of their own group while maintaining
the integrity of the nation as a whole.
2.  Second, it is important to achieve an agreement regarding an appropriate formula for dividing
the mineral revenue accruing to the government.  Fighting over these riches has been at the root
of much of the conflict, and a feeling of being cheated out of one’s “rightful” entitlement is the
single biggest potential spark for future conflicts.  The outlines of one such potential formula
seemed to be visible at one point in the past when it appeared that UNITA would largely control
diamond income while the MPLA would control oil income.  Lopsided though such an
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arrangment would be, it would still allow each faction the wherewithal to make investments in its
own area without requiring renegotiation at each new expenditure.  Indeed, this or any other
formula for dividing mineral rents would, if mutually agreed to, eliminate the biggest obstacles to
a workable solution while at the same time promoting economic growth in a sustainable and
viable manner.  It might be argued that UNITA, having been militarily defeated to a large extent,
has lost the leverage it once had to force such an agreement.  However, as this paper has made
clear, though UNITA may have been defeated militarily, the interests of its supporters and their
importance in the Angolan population remain, and will provide the basis for their political
strength in any form of future political system if it is based on democratic principles.
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Table 1: Oil Dependence of Selected Developing Countries
Country Oil Windfall as % of Non-Mining GDP
Algeria 27.1%
Angola 49.0%
Ecuador 16.8%
Indonesia 15.9%
Nigeria 22.8%
Trinidad & Tobago 38.9%
Venezuela 10.8%
Source:  Alan Gelb et. al. Oil Windfalls:  Blessing or Curse? Oxford University Press 1988 and
Tony Hodges  Angola from Afro-Stalinism to Petro-Diamond Capitalism Indiana University
Press 2001 p 132.
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Table 2.  Economic Performance, 1995-2000
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Real GDP
(Millions of 1995$US) NA 9,192 9,918 10,531 10,862 11,092
Total Population
(Millions-Mid Year Average) NA 9.437 9.557 9.736 9.927 10.145
Real GDP Per Capita
(1995$US Per Capita) NA 974 1,038 1,082 1,094 1,093
External Debt 11,515 10,541 10,160 10,903 10,915 NA
Debt Service 463 832 841 1,118 981 NA
Exports* 3,852 5,406 5,308 3,666 5,467 NA
External Debt/Exports % 298.9% 195.0% 191.4% 297.4% 199.7% NA
Debt Service/Exports % 12.0% 15.4% 15.8% 30.5% 17.9% NA
Consumer Prices, Period
Average: 1995=100 NA 4245.2 13550.1 25327.3 97807.0 415713.0
Annual % Growth NA 9953.0% 219.2% 86.9% 286.2% 325.0%
*Includes Goods and Services
Source: Country Review 2001-2202, CountryWatch.com
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Table 3.  Trade Balance, 1995-1999
($US Millions)
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Exports NA 4,473 4,157 3,542 3,930
1.  United States 2,173 2,596 2,696 76 2,337
2.  Belgium NA    NA    255 317 482
3.  China Mainland 124 222 549 140 323
4.  Taiwan 85 272 72 287 280
5.  Germany 232 140 28 60 95
Imports NA 2,038 2,275 2,243 1,909
1.  Portugal 379 437 508 451 324
2.  United States 286 295 309 390 278
3.  South Africa 149 380 209 215 208
4.  France 422 168 130 129 162
5.  United Kingdom 54 79 145 76 118
Trade Balance NA 2,435 1,882 1,300 2,021
Source: Country Review 2001-2202, CountryWatch.com
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13.For a discussion of structural transformation and the changes that this entails, see Chenery, H.
Robinson, S and M. Syrquin Industrialization and Growth - A Comparative Study, Oxford
University Press, 1986.  Part I “Structural Transformation” pp11-118.
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